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Abstract A crucial demand in dual tasks suﬀering from a
capacity limited processing mechanism is task-order
scheduling, i.e. the control of the order in which the two
component tasks are processed by this limited process-
ing mechanism. The present study aims to test whether
the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) is associated with
this demand. For this, 15 participants performed a
psychological refractory paradigm (PRP) type dual task
in an event-related functional magnetic resonance
(fMRI) experiment. In detail, two choice reaction tasks,
a visual (response with right hand) and an auditory
(response with left hand), were presented with a tem-
poral oﬀset of 200 ms, while the participants were re-
quired to respond to the tasks in the order of their
presentation. Importantly, the presentation order of the
tasks changed randomly. Based on previous evidence,
we argue that trials in which the present task order
changed as compared to the previous trial (diﬀerent-
order trials) impose higher demands on task coordina-
tion than same-order trials do. The analyses showed that
cortical areas along the posterior part of the left inferior
frontal sulcus as well as the right posterior middle
frontal gyrus were more strongly activated in diﬀerent-
order than in same-order trials, thus supporting the
conclusion that one function of the LPFC for dual-task
performance is the temporal coordination of two tasks.
Furthermore, it is discussed that the present ﬁndings
favour the active scheduling over the passive queuing
hypothesis of dual-task processing.
Introduction
Performing dual tasks usually results in performance
decrements as compared to single-task performance (for
a review, see e.g. Pashler, 1994). Such decrements, evi-
dent as prolonged reaction times and/or higher error
rates, are indicative of additional cognitive demands in
the dual-task situation as compared to the isolated
performance of the single tasks (Braun, 1998; De Jong,
1995; Duncan, 1979; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Luria &
Meiran, 2003; Meyer & Kieras, 1997). Surprisingly, the
question of how the brain handles these additional de-
mands is still largely open. This question is highly
important, because its answer allows deeper under-
standing of the fundamental brain mechanisms regulat-
ing goal-directed behaviour in complex situations with
contradictory and interfering information.
In recent years, a number of imaging studies aimed at
identifying the neuroanatomical correlates of the addi-
tional cognitive demands in dual-task performance. The
ﬁndings of these previous imaging studies suggested a
speciﬁc role of the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) for
dual-task processing (D’Esposito, Detre, Alsop, Shin,
Atlas, & Grossman, 1995; Goldberg et al., 1998; Schu-
bert & Szameitat, 2003; but see Jiang, Saxe, & Kanw-
isher, 2004). Speciﬁcally, these studies compared the
fMRI activation in dual-task blocks with the activation
when participants performed the component tasks in
single-task blocks, thereby employing the method of
cognitive subtraction (Friston, Price, Fletcher, Moore,
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Frackowiak, & Dolan, 1996). The ﬁnding of an ov-
eradditive activation in prefrontal regions was inter-
preted as being related to additional cognitive demands
present in the dual task, as compared to the summed
demands of both single tasks. However, while these
studies are highly valuable for the localisation of the
neuroanatomical correlates of dual-task performance,
they do not allow specifying which speciﬁc processes are
in particular associated with the dual-task related LPFC
activation. This is, because the results of a gross com-
parison between dual-task and single-task blocks reﬂect
the inﬂuence of numerous dual-task related demands.
Note, for example, that the amount of the working
memory load, the need to divide attention, as well as the
need to coordinate task processing may diﬀer between
dual-task and single-task blocks and, accordingly, may
be responsible for the observed activation diﬀerence (cf.
Jiang et al., 2004). The aim of the present study is,
therefore, to specify the processes which are related to
the activation of the lateral prefrontal cortex during
dual-task coordination.
The starting point of the present study are ﬁndings of
a previous study of ours (Szameitat, Schubert, Mu¨ller &
von Cramon, 2002). In that study, we used the method
of parametric manipulation1 in order to show that the
LPFC is in particular associated with the coordination
of the temporal order in which the component tasks are
processed (hereafter called ‘‘task-order scheduling’’).
According to a number of authors, the need for task-
order scheduling emerges in situations where two pro-
cessing stages or streams compete for access to a
capacity limited processing stage, like a bottleneck
mechanism in dual tasks of the psychological refractory
period (PRP) type (Fig. 1, De Jong, 1995; Luria &
Meiran, 2003; Umilta`, Nicoletti, Simion, Tagliabue, &
Bagnara, 1992; but see Pashler, 1994)2. The authors
suggested that this competition is resolved by control
mechanisms coordinating, i.e. planning and monitoring,
the order in which the tasks are processed. In order to
localise the function of task-order scheduling, we com-
pared two dual-task conditions with diﬀerent demands
on task-order scheduling, namely dual-task blocks with
a ﬁxed presentation order of the two component tasks
and blocks with a random presentation order. Since
participants responded to the tasks in the order of their
appearance, task processing had to be rearranged in
random-order blocks whenever the presentation order
changed (De Jong, 1995; Luria & Meiran, 2003).
Therefore, task-order scheduling was more demanding
in random-order as compared to ﬁxed-order blocks, in
which the same scheduling strategy could be applied
throughout a block. As a result, the LPFC was more
strongly activated in random- than in ﬁxed-order blocks,
which led to our conclusion that the LPFC is associated
with task-order scheduling in dual-task situations. The
ﬁndings of this experiment extended previous knowledge
in two aspects: Firstly, they replicated and conﬁrmed the
ﬁnding of cognitive subtraction studies that the LPFC is
associated with dual-task performance with the method
of parametric manipulation. But more importantly, they
established a way of specifying the function of the LPFC
for dual-task performance.
However, the ﬁndings of Szameitat et al. (2002) are
not completely conclusive in indicating an association of
the LPFC with task-order scheduling. This is, because in
that study the use of a block design may have resulted in
some further confounding inﬂuences, which may ham-
per the ﬁnal interpretation of the ﬁndings. For instance,
in random-order blocks, participants do not know which
task is presented ﬁrst, while they do so in ﬁxed-order
blocks. Accordingly, the demands to divide attention
between both tasks might have been diﬀerent in both
dual-task conditions. Thus, diﬀerences in divided
attention may have caused the activation diﬀerence be-
tween random-order and ﬁxed-order blocks, just like
diﬀerences in task-order scheduling demands as pro-
posed in Szameitat et al. As a further caveat, the low
temporal resolution of the used fMRI block design
prevents a ﬁne grained analysis of those processes, which
are ﬁnally related to the observed fMRI activation.
Note, that a block design implicates a summation of the
activation across the whole block, and, therefore, does
not allow the analysis of processes on the level of single
trials.
The present study aimed at characterising the role of
lateral-prefrontal cortices for dual-task performance in
more detail by avoiding the above mentioned possible
methodological shortcomings. For this, we employed, to
our knowledge as the ﬁrst imaging study of dual-task
performance, an event-related fMRI design (Rosen,
Buckner, & Dale, 1998). This allows a more elaborate
manipulation of task-order scheduling as compared to
Szameitat et al. (2002). In particular, the present
experimental manipulation is now based on a trial-wise
1According to the method of parametric manipulation the neuro-
anatomical correlate of a speciﬁc process can be localised by
manipulating the diﬃculty of that process. Those brain regions,
which change their activation in relation to the diﬃculty manipu-
lation are assumed to be the neural substrate associated with the
manipulated process (see e.g. Braver, Cohen, Nystrom, Jonides,
Smith, & Noll, 1997).
Fig. 1 Illustration of a capacity limited processing stage, i.e. a
bottleneck (shaded grey). Task-order scheduling is required because
both tasks compete for the processing by the bottleneck
2Some authors question the existence of a structural capacity lim-
itation but instead suggest that participants strategically introduce
partial serial processing of the tasks, e.g. because it may be faster
and/or may help to avoid errors (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Meyer &
Kieras, 1997). However, as soon as there is serial processing, irre-
spective of its structural or strategic nature, the question in which
order the tasks should be processed arises. Accordingly, task-order
scheduling is required under both assumptions, and the current
ﬁndings apply to both of them.
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modulation of task-order scheduling as proposed by De
Jong (1995) and Luria and Meiran (2003). These authors
have shown that participants are able to prepare the
processing order of the two tasks of a dual-task situation
before the beginning of a trial. In particular, it has been
shown that participants prepare to process the tasks in
the actual trial in the same order as they have been
processed in the previous trial. Therefore, in trials with
the same order (same-order trials) as in the preceding
trial, participants are prepared to process the correct
task ﬁrst, and the task-order scheduling demands are
rather low. On the contrary, if the presentation order
changes between trials (diﬀerent-order trials), partici-
pants are prepared to process the wrong task as the ﬁrst
task. In that case participants have to overcome the
preparation of the wrong task by additional cognitive
processing related to the re-organisation of task pro-
cessing, for instance by activating the correct task and/
or discarding the wrong task (De Jong, 1995; Luria &
Meiran, 2003). Accordingly, in diﬀerent-order trials, the
demands on task-order scheduling increase as compared
to same-order trials. Note, that same- and diﬀerent-or-
der trials are basically identical, they only diﬀer with
respect to the presentation order of the tasks in the
preceding trial. Thus, diﬀerent to Szameitat et al. (2002),
the two conditions now diﬀer merely with respect to
task-order scheduling demands, but not with respect to
demands on divided attention. Because the upcoming
task order is unpredictable in the present study, partic-
ipants have to divide their attention in same- as well as
in diﬀerent-order trials. Thus, if the lateral-prefrontal
cortex is associated with task-order scheduling in dual-
task situations, then it should be activated more strongly
in diﬀerent-order than in same-order trials.
Methods
Subjects
Fifteen neurologically healthy participants (eight wo-
men) took part in the experiment, each having given
prior informed consent according to the Max Planck
Institute guidelines. The study was approved by the local
ethics review board at the University of Leipzig, Ger-
many. All participants were right handed as assessed by
the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldﬁeld, 1971) and had nor-
mal or corrected to normal vision. The age ranged from
22 to 29 years (average 24 years).
Stimuli
Participants performed a PRP-type dual task, consisting
of two 3-choice reaction tasks, one auditory and one
visual (Fig. 2). A dual-task trial started with a green
screen with three horizontally arranged crosses (each
0.38 · 0.38) which were presented for 1,100 ms. The
middle cross was located at the centre of the screen and
served as ﬁxation cross. The two other crosses were lo-
cated horizontally to the left and right, each with a gap
of 2. After the presentation the screen was cleared and
the target stimuli were presented with a stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) of 200 ms. Prior testing revealed this
SOA as appropriate for convenient order detection (cf.
De Jong, 1995; Szameitat et al., 2002). The target stim-
ulus of the visual task consisted of a black square (1.6 ·
1.6) presented for 200 ms at one of the three locations
indicated by the crosses of the ﬁxation period. The target
stimulus of the auditory task was a 200 ms lasting tone
with a frequency of either 200, 600, or 1,800 Hz. The
presentation order of target stimuli was changed pseudo-
randomly, while it was guaranteed that in half of the
trials, the auditory stimulus was presented ﬁrst and in
the other half the visual stimulus, and that half of the
trials were diﬀerent-order trials and the other half same-
order trials. Due to the SOA of 200 ms the presentation
of both targets lasted 400 ms. After the presentation of
both targets, the screen was cleared for a response period
of 2,100 ms. Participants were allowed to respond from
the onset of the ﬁrst target until the end of the response
period, i.e. they had to respond within 2,500 ms after the
ﬁrst target appeared. Participants responded to the left
visual square with their right index ﬁnger, to the middle
square with their right middle ﬁnger, and to the right
square with their right ring ﬁnger. The low tone
(200 Hz) required a reaction with the left ring ﬁnger, the
middle tone (600 Hz) with the left middle ﬁnger and the
high tone (1,800 Hz) with the left index ﬁnger. After the
response period, either a blank screen or a visual error
feedback was presented for 300 ms. Altogether, one trial
lasted 3,900 ms.
The inter-trial-interval (ITI) was randomly either
2,100, 4,100 or 6,100 ms (on average 4,100 ms). This
jittering was implemented for better estimation of the
hemodynamic response (Burock, Buckner, Woldorﬀ,
Rosen, & Dale, 1998; Friston, Zarahn, Josephs, Henson,
& Dale, 1999). During the ITI only the central ﬁxation
cross was presented and had to be ﬁxated by the par-
ticipants.
Fig. 2 Timecourse of a dual-
task trial, in which the auditory
task is presented ﬁrst. The grey
bar denotes the presentation of
the tone. The inter-trial-interval
was either 2,100, 4,100 or
6,100 ms
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To estimate the baseline signal we additionally pre-
sented so-called null events (Friston et al., 1999; Josephs
& Henson, 1999). These null events were pseudo-ran-
domly included in the distribution of dual-task trials and
equalled them concerning timing, i.e. they lasted
3,900 ms plus the jittering ITI. During a null event, only
the central ﬁxation cross was presented. Accordingly,
null events were not obvious to the participants but were
only recognisable by the longer duration between two
trials. Participants were informed about the varying gaps
between trials and instructed to ﬁxate the central cross
during such events.
Design
An event-related design was used. The experiment con-
sisted of 72 same-order trials, 72 diﬀerent-order trials,
and 36 null events. Because it was unknown whether the
preparatory state of the task order was still present after
the presentation of a null event, task trials following null
events were discarded from the analysis. Since null
events could repeat, this resulted in the exclusion of 24
task trials, leaving 60 same-order and 60 diﬀerent-order
trials for the analysis. Thus, the experiment consisted of
180 trials and lasted 24 min, 13 s.
To increase the temporal resolution of the measured
BOLD signal, we used the method of oversampling
(Josephs, Turner, & Friston, 1997; Miezin, Maccotta,
Ollinger, Petersen, & Buckner, 2000). For this purpose,
half of the trials were delayed by 500 ms relative to the
onset of image acquisition (TR = 1 s). To account for
this shift, the ITI was shortened accordingly by 500 ms,
resulting in additional ITIs of 1.6, 3.6 or 5.6 s. Thus, the
oversampling method also resulted in a further jittering
of the ITI (six diﬀerent ITIs in total).
Due to the sluggishness of the hemodynamic response
(Rosen et al., 1998), event-related designs with rather
short ITIs, as in the present experiment, suﬀer from
transitional eﬀects of one trial to the next. To control for
such eﬀects, the transition probabilities, repetitions and
the distribution of the conditions across the time course
of the experiment were balanced in the best possible
way. This balancing was done for the factors oversam-
pling, jittering, auditory stimulus, visual stimulus, the
combination of auditory and visual stimulus, and the
experimental conditions of same-order, diﬀerent-order,
and null event. Each participant received a diﬀerent
stimulus protocol.
One to three days before the fMRI measurement,
participants practiced the task outside the scanner for
approximately 40 min.
Scanning procedure
The experiment was performed at the Max Planck
Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in
Leipzig, Germany (former Max Planck Institute of
Cognitive Neuroscience). Imaging was carried out with a
3T scanner (Medspec 30/100, Bruker, Ettlingen, Ger-
many) equipped with a standard birdcage head coil.
Participants were supine on the scanner bed, and cush-
ions were used to reduce head motion. Fourteen axial
slices (19.2 cm FOV, 64·64 matrix, 5 mm thickness,
2 mm spacing), parallel to the AC-PC plane and cov-
ering the whole brain were acquired using a single shot,
gradient recalled EPI sequence (TR 1 s, TE 30 ms, 90
ﬂip angle) sensitive to BOLD contrast. One functional
run with 1,453 volumes was administered, with each
volume sampling all 14 slices. Prior to the functional
run, 14 anatomical MDEFT slices and 14 EPI-T1 slices
were acquired. In a separate session, high-resolution
whole-brain images were acquired from each participant
using a T1-weighted three-dimensional segmented
MDEFT sequence. These images were linearly rotated




The fMRI data were analyzed using the software pack-
age LIPSIA (Lohmann, Mu¨ller, Bosch, Mentzel, Hess-
ler, Chen, et al., 2001). First, the functional data were
pre-processed. For this purpose, the ﬁrst seven timesteps
were removed and a slicewise movement correction in
the transverse direction was applied (Lohmann et al.,
2001). A Gaussian spatial ﬁlter (FWHM 6.35 mm) was
used for smoothing. The temporal oﬀset between
acquisition times of diﬀerent slices acquired in one vol-
ume were corrected using sinc interpolation.
After pre-processing, the functional and anatomical
data were co-registered: First, the MDEFT and EPI-T1
slices geometrically aligned with the functional slices
were linearly co-registered with the high-resolution 3-D
reference T1 data set of each participant. Rotational and
translational parameters computed for this registration
were stored in individual transformation matrices. Sec-
ond, each transformation matrix was transformed into a
standard brain size (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) by
linear scaling. Finally, these normalised transformation
matrices were applied to the individual fMRI data.
Next, the functional data were spatially re-scaled to a
resolution of 3·3·3 mm3 using trilinear interpolation.
After this linear co-registration and re-scaling, func-
tional and anatomical data were co-registered nonlin-
early: First, the anatomical image of the subject which
showed the least deviation from the averaged image of
all individual anatomies was taken as reference image.
Second, each anatomical image was morphed in a non-
linear fashion onto this standard image (Thirion, 1998)
and the individual transformation matrices were stored.
Finally, these transformation matrices were applied to
the individual fMRI data.
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Statistics
Statistical analysis was based on a voxelwise least
squares estimation using the general linear model for
serially auto-correlated observations (Friston, Holmes,
Worsley, Poline, Frith, & Frackowiak, 1995). A hemo-
dynamic response function with two parameters
(amplitude as parameter of interest and time derivative
as covariate) and a response delay of 6 s was used to
generate the design matrix. Low frequency signal drifts
were controlled by applying a temporal highpass ﬁlter
with a cutoﬀ frequency of 0.014 Hz. In addition, the
design matrix and the functional data were linearly
smoothed with a 4-s FWHM Gaussian kernel. For the
second-level group analysis, individual contrast images
were calculated by subtracting the corresponding
parameter estimates from each other. In a second step, a
voxel-wise one-sample t test was calculated based on all
individual contrast images (random eﬀect model),
resulting in a t-map reﬂecting the group statistic. Finally,
the t-map was transformed into a z-map. To account for
the possibility of false positives (Type-I error) we used a
rather high threshold for the z-map (z > 3.3, P <
0.0005, one-tailed, uncorrected) and an extent threshold
of 7 voxel (i.e., 441 mm3).
Results
Behavioural data
For the following analyses, we used one-sample paired t
tests with the signiﬁcance level calculated two-tailed.
The error analysis was performed with arcsine-trans-
formed relative error frequencies.
Diﬀerent-order trials were more diﬃcult than same-
order trials (Fig. 3). This is shown by an analysis of the
reaction times (RTs), yielding increased RTs in diﬀerent-
order compared to same-order trials. For the ﬁrst task,
this diﬀerence was 66 ms, t(14) = 7.27, P < 0.001, and
for the second task 72 ms, t(14) = 7.54, P< 0.001. The
RT increases for the ﬁrst and second task did not diﬀer,
t(14) = 0.86, P = 0.406, indicating that the order
manipulation had an additive eﬀect on the RTs in both
tasks. The same pattern of results was evident in the
error rates, i.e. diﬀerent-order trials showed higher error
rates than same-order trials. For the ﬁrst task, this dif-
ference was 5.3%, t(14) = 4.069, P < 0.01, and for the
second task 6.4%, t(14) = 4.046, P < 0.01 The increase
in errors rates tended to be higher in the second task as
compared to the ﬁrst task, t(14) = 2.06, P > 0.06. Be-
cause in a single trial, errors could occur either indi-
vidually in the ﬁrst or second task or concurrently in
both tasks, the overall rate of erroneous trials is not
evident from the just mentioned ﬁgures. The overall
error rate (Fig. 3, bars) was higher by 8% in diﬀerent-
order trials than in same-order trials, t(14) = 5.56, P <
0.001.
FMRI data
In the ﬁrst step, we determined cortical areas associated
with task-order scheduling by calculating the contrast
(diﬀerent-order trials) - (same-order trials), (see Table 1
and Fig. 4, upper row). This contrast revealed a large
activation in the right LPFC with a peak in the middle
frontal gyrus (MFG), which extended into the inferior
frontal sulcus (IFS) and the junction area of the IFS and
the precentral sulcus (inferior frontal junction, IFJ). In
the left LPFC, we observed a more circumscribed acti-
vation along the posterior part of IFS, which extended
into the IFJ as well. Besides prefrontal activations, the
comparison of diﬀerent- and same-order trials revealed
cortical areas exclusively in the right hemisphere. There
was one focus of activation in the superior parietal lobe,
along the posterior part of the horizontal and the
descending segment of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS). In
addition, we observed an inferior parietal activation in
the supra-marginal gyrus. Finally, we found two further
activated areas, one in the posterior inferior temporal
gyrus and one in the medial occipital gyrus.
In the second step, we performed a regions-of-interest
(ROI) analysis for the peak voxel in the left IFS (35, 5,
27) and the right MFG (31, 5, 41), (Fig. 4, lower row).
For this, we ﬁrst calculated an average signal course for
a period of 11 s after trial onset for each condition and
participant. Then, we determined individually for each
participant and ROI, the percent signal change (PSC) of
the conditions diﬀerent-order and same-order trials by
relating the signal courses of these conditions to the
signal course of the null events. Thus, the PSC was
calculated individually for each timestep. To test for a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between diﬀerent-order and same-
order trials, we averaged the PSC values across the main
part of the hemodynamic response, i.e. from 4 to 8 s
(both inclusive), and calculated an one-sample paired t
test (two-sided). In both prefrontal areas, diﬀerent-order
trials exhibited a signiﬁcantly higher PSC than same-
order trials, t(14) = 3.41, P < 0.01, for the left IFS and
t(14) = 3.13, P < 0.01, for the right MFG. This in-
Fig. 3 Behavioural Data. Left axis and lines denote reaction times
of the ﬁrst (RT1, ﬁlled symbols) and second task (RT2, open
symbols). Right axis and bars denote the error rates. Diﬀerent-order
trials showed signiﬁcantly higher reaction times and error rates
than same-order trials
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dicates, that diﬀerent-order trials result in higher activity
in lateral prefrontal areas than same-order trials. This
holds true for an analysis based on parameter estimates
according to the general linear model, as well as one that
is based on the PSC calculated directly from the raw
data.
Fig. 4 Upper row. Activation maps for the comparison (diﬀerent-
order > same-order), thresholded at z > 3.3. Cortical areas
(encircled) along the left posterior part of the IFS and in the right
posterior MFG are more strongly activated in diﬀerent-order than
in same-order trials. Maps are projected onto saggital images of the
non-linearly averaged individual anatomies at x= 35 (left image)
and x = +31 (right image) according to Talairach & Tournoux
(1988). Lower row. ROI analyses of the voxel of peak activation in
the left IFS and right MFG. When averaged across seconds 4–8
(binned area of x-axis) diﬀerent-order trials exhibit a signiﬁcant
higher percent signal change (PSC) than same-order trials.
Asterisks denote a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between order-change
and order-repetition trials at individual timepoints (P< 0.05, one-
sided). Percent signal change was calculated relative to null-events
individually for each ROI and timepoint
Table 1 Stereotactic coordinates (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), anatomical locations, and z scores of peak activation in the comparison
(diﬀerent-order > same-order)
Cortical Area Hemi BA x y z Voxel mm3 z
Frontal
Inf frontal S L 9/44/6 35 5 27 7 458 3.55
Middle frontal G R 9/6 31 5 41 24 1547 4.42
Other
Supramarginal G R 40 59 52 27 14 917 3.54
Inf temporal G R 37 43 58 3 7 449 3.78
Intraparietal S R 7 31 76 44 10 667 3.67
Medial occipital G R 19 41 79 18 15 985 4.32
Volume of the activated areas is given in the number of raw data voxels (Voxel) and in volume (mm3). Abbreviations: Hemi = Hemisphere
(L = left, R = right); BA = Brodmann’s area; G = gyrus; S = sulcus; Inf = inferior; Sup = superior
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As illustrated in Fig. 4 (lower row), all areas men-
tioned in Table 1 are already activated in same-order
trials, as compared to the null events. Thus, the observed
areas are not newly involved in diﬀerent-order trials, but
instead they are involved in diﬀerent- and same-order
trials, but with diﬀerent strength.
To identify which areas were activated overall by
dual-task performance, we calculated the comparison
((diﬀerent-order trials + same-order trials) / 2  null
events). The results of this analysis are presented in
Table 2.
Discussion
In the present study, we parametrically manipulated the
demands on task-order scheduling in a PRP dual task
by presenting trials with the same task order as com-
pared to the previous trial and trials with a diﬀerent
task order. Speciﬁcally, this manipulation is assumed to
draw on task-order scheduling demands in dual-task
situations involving a capacity limited processing stage
(De Jong, 1995; Luria & Meiran, 2003). Importantly,
we observed increased activation in lateral-prefrontal
areas when the demands on task-order scheduling were
increased. In particular, this allows reﬁning the func-
tion of lateral-prefrontal areas in dual-task perfor-
mance, thereby extending the ﬁndings of previous
studies on the functional neuroanatomy of dual-task
performance.
Lateral prefrontal cortices
In particular, two lateral prefrontal areas, the left pos-
terior IFS and the right MFG, were more strongly
activated in diﬀerent- compared to same-order trials. We
interpret this as evidence that these areas are associated
with the process of task-order scheduling, i.e. the plan-
ning and monitoring of the processing order of both
tasks. However, it is noteworthy to mention that these
areas are highly active already during same-order trials,
which indicates that task-order scheduling may be re-
quired in these trials. This is due to the fact that even if
the order does not change, the short SOA between the
tasks results in competition and the possibility that the
tasks are processed accidentally in the wrong order. To
avoid this, diﬀerent authors suggested that control
mechanisms monitor and, if necessary, coordinate task
processing even in the case of same-order trials (Meyer
& Kieras, 1997; Norman & Shallice, 1986). Therefore,
this ﬁnding is in line with our conclusion that the pres-
ently observed areas are associated with the process of
task-order scheduling.
The cortical areas along the posterior part of the
IFS and MFG have been associated with a number of
Table 2 Stereotactic coordinates (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), anatomical locations, and z scores of (local) peak activation in the
comparison [(diﬀerent-order + same-order)/2 – null-events]
Cortical Area BA Left Hemisphere Right Hemisphere
x y z z x y z z
Frontal
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 32 4 44 11 4.90
Sup Frontal S (medial) 6 8 17 43 5.18
Inf Frontal S 8/9 38 17 31 4.83
Inf Frontal S / precentral S 6/9/44 41 2 30 4.75
Precentral G 6 47 2 12 4.89 44 2 15 5.37
Central S / precentral G 4/6 34 7 50 5.23 25 10 44 5.00
Parietal
Postcentral S / inf parietal lobe 40 37 31 46 5.18 40 31 44 5.71
Sup parietal lobe (SPL) 7 29 46 49 5.18 26 55 44 5.60
SPL / intraparietal sulcus 7 20 58 44 5.10
Temporal
Sup temp G 41/42 50 40 18 4.74 44 31 21 5.70
Sup temp G / sup temp S 21/22 50 46 14 5.67
Occipital
Fusiform G 37/19 38 64 12 5.34
Temporo-parietal-occipital junction 39 49 67 12 5.40
Calcarine S 17 13 73 14 4.97
Lingual G 18 7 73 7 5.45
Mid occ G 19 46 82 11 5.36
Mid occ G / sup occ G 18/19 23 100 18 4.16
Other
Putamen 20 11 11 5.63
Caudate nucleus 17 8 8 5.50
Thalamus 16 16 5 5.84 16 16 5 5.26
Abbreviations: BA Brodmann’s area; G gyrus; S sulcus; Inf inferior; Sup superior; temp temporal; occ occipital
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further tasks, like the task switching paradigm (Dove,
Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & von Cramon, 2000;
Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger, & Carter, 2000), the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Goldberg et al.,
1998), or the Go-/No Go paradigm (Konishi, Nakaj-
ima, Uchida, Kikyo, Kameyama, & Miyashita, 1999).
One shared component of these paradigms is that they
require the coordination of task processing under the
premise that two tasks have to be performed or could
be performed simultaneously and that these two tasks
interfere in some way with each other. Such interfer-
ence might arise by a number of causes, such as the
competition for a capacity limited mechanism in the
dual-task paradigm, ambiguous stimulus or response
sets in the task-switching paradigm, or the need to
perform a non-dominant action while a predominant
action could be performed as well, as in the Go-/No
Go and WCST paradigms. Thus, the converging evi-
dence suggests that the LPFC might not only be
associated with task-order scheduling in dual-task
performance but in any situation requiring the coor-
dination of diﬀerent interfering tasks (Duncan, 2001;
Grafman, 1995).
This idea is also consistent with assumptions of
Brass and von Cramon (2004) who recently suggested
that the IFJ (junction of IFS and precentral sulcus)
constitutes an unique prefrontal cortical area, which is
speciﬁcally associated with context-related updating of
the general task representation. Such an updating
process is likely to be part of the task-order scheduling
mechanism, which is required particularly if the exter-
nal context switches in diﬀerent-order trials compared
to same-order trials.
Previous research about the function of lateral pre-
frontal cortices suggests that the currently observed
activation foci located along the posterior IFS and in
the posterior MFG might subserve diﬀerent functions
for task control (e.g. D’Esposito et al., 1998; Owen,
2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999). In more detail, the IFS
might be related to the retrieval, implementation, and
maintenance of the task set, i.e. the set of stimulus-
response associations (Brass & von Cramon, 2004;
Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller, & Wagner, 2003). Op-
posed to this, the posterior MFG might be related to
monitoring (Petrides, Alivisatos, Meyer, & Evans,
1993), interference resolution (Bunge, Ochsner, Des-
mond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 2001), and the selection of
the appropriate task (Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frac-
kowiak, & Passingham, 2000). For this, the MFG
might operate on and/or modulate the contents stored
in the IFS (Owen, Evans, & Petrides, 1996; Petrides,
1996). Thus, in diﬀerent-order trials, the MFG might
re-arrange, e.g. by activating and/or inhibiting, repre-
sentations stored in the IFS. Alternatively, the MFG
might monitor the presentation order of the tasks and
initiate an updating of the task representations per-
formed by the IFS. Further studies are clearly needed
to dissociate the functionality of these two areas for
dual-task processing.
Parietal cortices
The manipulation of task-scheduling demands resulted
not only in LPFC activation but also in activation of
parietal areas, e.g. along the IPS. This observation is in
line with a number of studies showing that the demand
to coordinate task processing is associated with a net-
work of areas consisting mainly of prefrontal and pari-
etal cortices. Several authors have suggested a functional
dissociation between prefrontal and parietal areas for
the coordination of task processing. In more detail, it
has been proposed that the prefrontal cortex is associ-
ated with the initiation and coordination of attentional
processes while the parietal cortex is implementing these
processes (Clark, Egan, McFarlane, Morris, Weber,
Sonkkilla, et al., 2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002;
Hopﬁnger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Norman &
Shallice, 1986). In other words, it has been proposed
that the top-down control of the prefrontal cortex
inﬂuences the information processing in parietal associ-
ation cortices (Cohen, Braver, & O’Reilly, 1996; Desi-
mone, 1996; Miller, 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999). Thus,
the task scheduling organized by the prefrontal cortex
might be realised by or rely on its interaction with
superior parietal areas (cf. Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon,
Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002). Although not completely
conclusive, our data are consistent with these assump-
tions.
Implications for cognitive models of dual-task perfor-
mance
It is generally assumed that there is a relation between
fMRI activation and cognitive processing, insofar as
additional or increased fMRI activation in one task
compared to another is indicative of additional or in-
creased cognitive demands in that task (Beeck, Wage-
mans, & Vogels, 2001; Humphreys & Price, 2001;
Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann,
2001; Sarter, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 1996; cf. also Koch,
Ruge, Brass, Rubin, Meiran, & Prinz, 2003). Accord-
ingly, the present ﬁnding of higher fMRI-activation in
diﬀerent-order trials indicate that these trials are asso-
ciated with increased cognitive demands as compared to
same-order trials. But what are the implications of this
conclusion for contemporary cognitive models of dual-
task performance?
Two mechanisms have been diﬀerentiated about how
the tasks are processed if a capacity limited processing
bottleneck requiring serial processing of the component
tasks is present, passive queuing (Pashler, 1994) and ac-
tive scheduling (De Jong, 1995; Luria & Meiran, 2003; cf.
also Jiang et al., 2004). Importantly, both make diﬀerent
predictions about the cognitive demands in same- and
diﬀerent-order trials. According to passive queuing, the
tasks are simply processed on a ﬁrst-comes ﬁrst-served
basis. If the bottleneck is occupied by processing the ﬁrst
task, the representations referring to the second task are
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held in a passive queue until the bottleneck has ﬁnished
processing the ﬁrst task. Thus, this account does not
assume increased cognitive demands associated with the
scheduling of the tasks, monitoring task performance,
or, more generally, with any type of controlled/active
interference resolution (see e.g. Pashler, 1994). Because
this account assumes that the processing order is deter-
mined solely by the arrival times of the task processes at
the capacity-limited processing stage, diﬀerent-order
trials should impose the same cognitive demands as
same-order trials (cf. De Jong, 1995). Therefore, the
passive queuing hypothesis predicts both conditions to
elicit identical fMRI activation patterns.
But this is clearly not the case. Opposed to the pre-
diction of the passive queuing account, we observed
higher fMRI activation in diﬀerent-order than in same-
order trials. This ﬁnding is in perfect accordance with
active scheduling accounts, which assume that task
processing is actively monitored and controlled. For
instance, it has been proposed that task-order schedul-
ing, stopping Task 2 processing, switching the bottle-
neck from Task 1 to Task 2 after processing of Task 1
has ﬁnished, and reinstating Task 2 processing are pro-
cesses which require active executive control and moni-
toring (De Jong, 1995; Logan & Gordon, 2001; Luria &
Meiran, 2003; Meyer & Kieras, 1997). Active scheduling
accounts are based on the interpretation of known
empirical ﬁndings suggesting that task order can be
prepared in advance and that, if this preparation is
wrong, the re-organisation of task processing results in
increased cognitive demands as compared to situations
where a re-organisation is not required (De Jong, 1995;
Luria & Meiran, 2003). Accordingly, active scheduling
accounts are consistent with our observation of higher
fMRI activation in diﬀerent-order than in same-order
trials. Taken together, the current ﬁnding supports ac-
tive scheduling accounts of dual-task performance.
However, note that the assumption of an active sched-
uling mechanism in dual tasks does not contradict the
assumption of a structural central bottleneck (Pashler,
1994; see also Schubert, 1999). Instead, in our view ac-
tive scheduling is, in particular, necessary to organise
competition of task processing at capacity limited pro-
cessing stages in dual-task situations.
It has to be noted that the present ﬁndings do not
allow deciphering the exact mechanism of task-order
scheduling. For instance, it might be that task-order
scheduling operates exclusively as a priming of the
stimulus category and/or modality of the task expected
to be ﬁrst. However, in our view it is not plausible that
task-order scheduling operates solely at the stimulus
level and not at the level of tasks or task sets, i.e. at the
level of stimulus-response associations. In particular, the
ﬁndings of De Jong (1995) and Luria and Meiran (2003)
suggest that participants not only prepare in advance the
ﬁrst task (or ﬁrst stimulus processing) but also the spe-
ciﬁc switch of the bottleneck from task-1 processing to
task-2 processing. For instance, Luria and Meiran
(2003) reported an overadditive interaction between
SOA and task order onto the reaction times in the sec-
ond task (RT2). Most importantly, the increase of RT2
in diﬀerent-order compared to same-order trials at short
compared to long SOA vanished with suﬃcient task
preparation time. This, especially, suggests that task-
order scheduling does not exclusively operate as a
mechanism that primes the ﬁrst stimulus. Instead it
works at the level of the whole representation of both
component tasks (see Luria and Meiran, 2003, for a
detailed discussion). This conclusion is additionally
supported by neuroimaging studies. Recent ﬁndings of
imaging studies suggest that the region of the LPFC,
which was activated in the present study, is strongly
associated with coordination at the task level (see Dis-
cussion section ‘‘Lateral prefrontal cortices’’), while
stimulus- or response-related order processing is more
likely to be associated with the precentral gyrus/sulcus
and/or superior parietal cortices (e.g. Coull & Nobre,
1998; Herath, Klingberg, Young, Amunts, & Roland,
2001; Schubotz, Friederici, & von Cramon, 2000; see as
well Schubert & Szameitat, 2003). Taken together, we
think that task-order scheduling operates, at least partly,
at the level of the tasks (see also Brass & von Cramon,
2004).
Related ﬁndings
In a recent study, Jiang et al. (2004) parametrically
manipulated the temporal overlap of the tasks by com-
paring a short and a long SOA and proposed that dual-
task related areas should be activated more strongly at
short than at long SOA. However, Jiang et al. failed to
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the activation
patterns at diﬀerent SOAs. Therefore, they argued in
favour of the passive queuing approach. The reason for
the diﬀerent ﬁndings of Jiang et al. and the present study
are not completely clear, but may be related to meth-
odological issues and to diﬀerences between the tasks
used by Jiang et al. and in the present study. Firstly,
Jiang et al. argue on the basis of accepting the null
hypothesis, which suﬀers from serious methodological
caveats (e.g. Cortina & Folger, 1998; Kluger & Tiko-
chinsky, 2001). Secondly, the task used by Jiang et al.
might have been considerably easier than the task in the
present study, which might explain the lack of a signif-
icant diﬀerence between the corresponding experimental
conditions. For instance, Jiang et al. used 2-choice
reaction tasks while we used more complex 3-choice
tasks (but see results of Herath et al., 2001). Addition-
ally, the SOA was manipulated between 48 s lasting
blocks in the Jiang et al. study, while it was manipulated
between trials in most previous PRP imaging studies
(Herath et al., 2001; Schubert & Szameitat, 2003;
Szameitat et al., 2002; but see Koch, Metin, & Schuch,
2003). Thus, in the study of Jiang et al. participants
performed a dual task with the same order and same
SOA throughout a block, which might have resulted in
only very moderate demands on cognitive control pro-
549
cesses involved in dual-task processing. We suggest that
these demands might not have been suﬃcient to elicit
stable dual-task related hemodynamic responses (see
also Szameitat, 2003).
Given that in the present experiment two diﬀerent
tasks, one auditory and one visual, were presented
intermingled, the question about the relation of our
paradigm to the task-switching paradigm (Jersild, 1927)
arises. Although there is indeed one, a task-switching
account cannot explain the current ﬁndings for the fol-
lowing reason (cf. Lien & Ruthruﬀ, 2004). In diﬀerent-
order trials, the component tasks locally repeat (e.g.,
visual- auditory -> auditory-visual), which means that
the demands to switch between the component tasks are
low. Opposed to this, in same-order trials, the tasks are
locally diﬀerent (visual- auditory -> visual-auditory),
which should result in higher task-switching demands.
Therefore, the task-switching account would predict
associated cortical areas to be activated more strongly in
same-order trials than in diﬀerent-order trials (Dove
et al., 2000). However, not a single cortical area showed
this pattern. Instead, the LPFC was activated more
strongly in diﬀerent-order trials, which involved lower
task-switching, but higher task-order scheduling de-
mands3.
Conclusion
The ability to coordinate diﬀerent interfering tasks is
crucial for our everyday life, because it enables goal-
oriented and coherent behaviour even in situations
where diﬀerent potential actions interfere with or dis-
tract each other. Thus, the present ﬁndings give insight
about how the brain realises complex human behaviour.
We showed that areas of the LPFC are involved in the
re-organisation of behaviour if current behavioural
goals change rapidly (Duncan, 2001; Fuster, 2000). In
more detail, the LPFC seems to enable the fast recog-
nition of a changed action goal, as is the case in a dif-
ferent-order trial, and the appropriate re-organisation of
task processing to accomplish this goal. Accordingly, the
LPFC seems to shield from distraction to enable per-
sistent and coherent behaviour while at the same time
enabling an unique ﬂexibility of behaviour if the action
goal changes (Duncan, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001).
In summary, we showed that cortical areas of the
posterior LPFC along the IFS and in the MFG are in-
volved in the co-ordination and re-organisation of the
processing of two concurrent tasks, which interfere with
each other due to a limited processing mechanism. The
present approach and ﬁndings allow a much more de-
tailed description of the functionality of the LPFC for
dual-task performance as compared to previous studies.
We conclude that the LPFC is essential for the organi-
sation of complex human behaviour especially in situa-
tions where contradictory or interfering information has
to be processed in order to execute goal oriented
behaviour.
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